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Like experts in other fields, expert computer programmers can recall at a glance 
far more information relevant to their field than novices can. One explanation for 
this difference is that experts not only have more information, they have it better 
organized into meaningful chunks. In this paper, we infer the details of individual 
programmers’ chunks of key programming concepts using the Reitman-Rtreter 
(Cognitive Psychology, 1980, 12(4), 5.54-581.) technique for inferring tree struc- 
tures from recall orders. Differences in organizations accompany skill-level differ- 
ences. Beginner programmers’ organizations show a rich variety of common- 
language associations to these programming concepts; Intermediate programmers 
show mixtures of programming and common-language associations; and Experts 
show remarkably similar, but not identical, organizations based clearly on pro- 
gramming knowledge. 
Experts and novices differ in their abilities to process large amounts of 
meaningful information. This difference has been seen in the domains of 
chess, Go, electronics, bridge, music, and physics (Chase & Simon, 
1973a, 1973b; Reitman, 1976; Sloboda, 1976; Egan & Schwartz, 1979; 
Engle & Bukstel, 1978; Chat-tress, 1976; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & 
Simon, 1980). A common explanation for this difference is that experts 
have not only more information, they have that information better orga- 
nized into useful chunks. Instead of perceiving and remembering indi- 
vidual pieces of information, they process meaningful groups of informa- 
tion, making their perception more efficient and their recall performance 
much higher. 
These earlier studies introduced the notion that superior organization of 
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information is the key to expert performance. They were weak, however, 
in specifying the details of that organization. For instance, both Chase and 
Simon, and Reitman assumed that chunks are separated by long pauses in 
recall. But identifying chunk boundaries with long pauses suffers from 
two drawbacks: First, pauses are intolerably variable across trials, and 
second, as used, reveal only a single level of chunking. This second 
shortcoming is particularly limiting since it is likely that the experts’ 
chunks are hierarchical. Another way to uncover organization, used by 
Reitman, and Egan and Schwartz, is to present items on a sheet of paper 
and have the subject draw circles around those that are related. Though 
this drawing technique can delineate a hierarchical structure and even 
overlapping chunks, it is limited by the subject’s ability to introspect 
accurately and reliably. Here, we use a new, more sophisticated tech- 
nique for showing the details of the organizations of information for indi- 
vidual subjects and go on to describe the general pattern of differences in 
organization that accompany subjects’ different skill levels. 
The technique used here, developed by Reitman and Rueter (1980), 
produces a hierarchical representation of information from regularities in 
the orders in which items are recalled over many trials. This technique 
capitalizes on the fact that people tend to recall all items of one chunk 
before moving on to the next chunk (e.g., Cohen, 1966). Consequently, 
we define a chunk as a group of items recalled together on all trials. 
Similar techniques have been proposed, notably those of Friendly (1977), 
Monk (1976), and Bushke (Bushke, 1976; Zangen, Ziegelbaum, & 
Bushke, 1976), but they have quite different working assumptions. The 
Reitman and Rueter algorithm is preferred here because, unlike the 
others, it is based on a psychological theory of recall production and 
generates a structure that is unique, reliable, and detailed (see Reitman 
and Rueter (1980) for a detailed comparison with these other techniques). 
Two benefits derive from using computer programmers as subjects. 
First, recent studies of the differences in expert and novice programmers, 
focusing on gross external performance measures, have met with mixed 
success. Skill or experience has been shown to be related to the time 
necessary to get a particular program written and running, the number of 
times a program is submitted before completion, the number of languages 
known, and the rated familiarity of certain programming concepts, but not 
with time to debug, modify, or comprehend a new program (Lucas & 
Kaplan, 1974; Sheppard, Curtis, Millman, & Love, 1979). Intuitively, one 
would expect that though some of these exrernaf measures may not differ, 
surely experts view these tasks differently than novices. This paper sets 
out to investigate internal differences. 
The second benefit relates to a current debate in the computer science 
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literature on the merits of “structured programming.” Structured pro- 
grams are composed of a hierarchy of independent modules (see 
Shneiderman, 1980; Shneiderman & Mayer, Note 1). The advocates of 
structured programming hypothesize that such organizations of code are 
naturally easier to understand and modify because they are consonant 
with the programmer’s mental organization. Though structured programs 
have been shown to be easier to modify than standard programs (Lucas & 
Kaplan, 1974), the argument that this is due to their consonance with 
mental organization is based only on expert intuition. The research here, 
though not a direct answer to that question, may provide an empirical 
base for testing these intuitions since it illustrates the use of a technique 
that provides a detailed representation of mental organization. 
The work here has two parts. In our first study, the classic ex- 
pert-novice difference in short-term recall is replicated with computer 
programmers who viewed either a coherent or a scrambled version of a 
computer program. This step is important in showing that the materials 
and experts that we studied give familiar results. Then in a second study, 
we infer the details of subjects’ organizations of programming concepts by 
constructing hierarchical representations of the relations among computer 
language keywords. The similarities and dissimilarities of these inferred 




Subjects of three skill levels were shown a 31-line, ALGOL W computer program in either 
normal or scrambled version for five 2-min study trials. Groups of two or three subjects saw 
the program projected onto a screen by an overhead projector. In the 3-min recall period that 
followed each trial, subjects wrote as much of the program as they could remember on a 
blank recall sheet, putting each recalled line on the sheet as close to its presented position as 
possible. A blank recall sheet was used for each trial; subjects were prevented from looking 
at their previous recall attempts and were asked to recall everything anew on each trial. 
The program to be recalled was written by an ALGOL W expert, the third author, who did 
not serve as a subject in this experiment. Tables 1 and 2 contain the actual program; the first 
is the normal, executable version, the second a randomly scrambled version. Since indenta- 
tion is important to the meaning of an ALGOL W program, it was retained in the scrambled 
version. Half of the subjects in each skill level saw the normal version, half the scrambled. 
Fifty-three subjects at three skill levels were tested in Experiment I. Twenty-four sub- 
jects, called Beginners, were just starting their first ALGOL W course; six of these had 
previous experience with either BASIC or FORTRAN. Twenty-three subjects, called 
Intermediates, had just completed their first ALGOL W course; seven of these had previous 
experience with either BASIC or FORTRAN. Six subjects, the Experts, taught ALGOL W, 
had over 2000 hr of general programming experience, and had an average of over 400 hr of 
experience in ALGOL W. 
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Results 
The recall sheets were scored by counting the number of lines written 
verbatim in their proper relative order. To be counted as correct, a line 
needed neither to be placed in its exact position on the recall sheet nor to 
have the proper indentation. A simple order reversal of lines was scored as 
just one correct. The only shorthand allowed was a ditto mark. 
Figure 1 shows the number of lines correctly recalled on each of the five 
trials by Beginners, Intermediates, and Experts after seeing either the 
normal or scrambled version. Clearly, skill level differentiates recall per- 
formance for the normal version but not for the scrambled version. Unlike 
the results of Chase and Simon, and Reitman for chess and Go, the skill- 
related differences appear on more than just the first trial. 
The results of a three-way analysis of variance confirm this pattern of 
results. Significance is accepted at p < .Ol. There were significant main 
effects for trials, F(4, 188) = 108.01; version (normal or scrambled), F( 1, 
188) = 25.63; and skill level, F(2, 188) = 11.84. All interactions were 
likewise significant: version x trial, F(4, 188) = 3.32; trial x level, F(8, 
188) = 4.99; version x level, F(2, 188) = 15.7; and version x trial x level, 
F(8, 188) = 2.71. 
The two-way interaction involving skill level and version suggests that 
experienced programmers show superior recall only in the normal version 
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FIG. 1. Number of program lines recalled by Experts, Intermediates, and Beginners after 
being presented with either a normal version or a scrambled version of the program. 
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of the program. A t test between Experts’ and Beginners’ recall, averaged 
over trials, was not significant for the scrambled version but was signifi- 
cant for the normal version, t(14) = 2.4, p < .05. Further, the three-way 
interaction suggests that for the normal version the disparity in recall 
among subjects of differing experience changed over trials. Figure 1 
shows that the disparity increased with added trials. Only this last result 
differs from the results of Chase and Simon and Reitman, where most of 
the skill difference appeared on the first trial; there, the disparity de- 
creased with added trials. 
Closer examination of the particular lines recalled reveals characteristic 
patterns of recall for subjects with different skill levels. The right-hand 
panels of Tables 1 and 2 show the proportions of subjects at each skill 
level who recalled each line on the last (fifth) trial. In the normal version 
of the program (Table I), there are clear differences. Although subjects of 
all skill levels recalled the short lines, such as the initial BEGIN and the 
TABLE 1 
Proportion of Experts (E), Intermediates (I), and Beginners (B) 
Who Recalled Each Line of the Normal Version of the Program 
E I B 
1 BEGIN 1.00 
2 INTEGER PTR, TRIALS, OBJECTS; 1.00 
3 INTEGER ARRAY ORDERS (1::32, 1::21); 1.00 
4 INTEGER ARRAY TEMP (1::32); .67 
5 STRING (27) ALPHA; .67 
6 ALPHA := “ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ”; .67 
7 READ (TRIALS, OBJECTS); .67 
8 ASSERT (0 < TRIALS AND TRIALS < 32); .33 
9 ASSERT (0 < OBJECTS AND OBJECTS < 27); .33 
10 FOR I := 1 UNTIL TRIALS + 1 DO 1.00 
11 FOR J := 1 UNTIL OBJECTS DO 1.00 
12 BEGIN READON (ORDERS (1.J)): ,. .61 
13 ASSERT (0 c ORDERS (I,J) AND ORDERS (1,J) < 27) .33 
14 END; .67 
15 FOR J := 1 UNTIL OBJECTS DO -67 
16 IF ORDERS (TRIALS + l,J) 2 J THEN .33 
17 BEGIN PTR := 1; .33 
18 WHILE ORDERS (TRIALS + I,PTR) 5 J DO Fl-R := PTR + 1; .33 
19 ASSERT PTR < 27; .33 
20 FOR I : = 1 UNTIL TRIALS + 1 DO -67 
21 BEGIN TEMP(1) : = ORDERS (1,J); 133 
22 ORDERS (I,J) := ORDERS (1,PTR); .67 
23 ORDERS (1,PTR) : = TEMP (I) .33 
24 END 67 . _ I  
25 END; .67 
26 FOR I := 1 UNTIL TRIALS DO .67 
27 BEGIN WRITE (I, “:“); .67 
28 FOR J : = 1 UNTIL OBJECTS DO .67 
29 WRITEON (ALPHA (ORDERS (1,J) ; 1)) .33 
30 END .33 
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TABLE 2 
Proportion of Experts (E), Intermediates (I), and Beginners (B) 
Who Recalled Each Line of the Scrambled Version of the Program 
E I B 
ENDS scattered throughout the program (lines 1, 14, 24, 25, and 31, 
respectively), the Experts and Intermediates added the familiar lines for 
the beginning of a nested loop for reading in a matrix (lines 10, 1 I, and 12), 
and the Experts added parts of a iater loop that exchanges values and 
begins the output sequence (lines 20-28). The Experts have used similar 
devices many times, recognize the lines as a chunk, and are therefore able 
to recall more. 
In the scrambled version of the program (Table 2), skill differences are 
not so apparent. Subjects of all skill levels tended to recall the lines that 
set up the string of alphabetic characters (lines 15 and 17), a few of the 
middle ENDS (lines 6 and 18 but not 12 and 22), and the END that 
fortuitously appeared at the end (line 31). But only the Experts addition- 
ally recalled the familiar loop constituents near the beginning (lines 3, 5, 
and 7), missing the easier final END (line 31). In the scrambled version, 













WHILE ORDERS (TRIALS + 1,FTR) P J DO PTR := FTR + 1; .33 
READ (TRIALS, OBJECTS); .67 
BEGIN FTR := 1; 1.00 
ASSERT (0 i ORDERS(V) AND ORDERS(I,J) i 27) .33 
FOR I : = 1 UNTIL TRIALS DO 1.00 
END 
ASSERT (0 < OBJECTS AND OBJECTS < 27); 




ASSERT (0 < TRIALS AND TRIALS =s 32); .33 
BEGIN WRITE (I, “:“); .oo 
INTEGER ARRAY ORDERS (1::32, 1::27); .oo 
END; .oo 
FOR I := I UNTIL TRIALS + 1 DO .33 
14 ORDERS (1. PTR) := TEMP (I) .oo 
I8 END. 
19 FOR J : = 1 UNTIL OBJECTS DO 
20 BEGIN TEMP(1) := ORDERS (1,J); 
21 FOR J := 1 UNTIL TRIALS + 1 DO 
END; 
2’: BEGIN 
24 FOR J : = 1 UNTIL OBJECTS DO 
25 ASSERT PTR < 27; 
26 INTEGER FTR, TRIALS, OBJECTS; 
27 WRITEON (ALPHA (ORDERS (LJ) ; 1)) 
28 ORDERS (1,J) := ORDERS (LPTR); 
29 INTEGER ARRAY TEMP (1::32); 
30 FOR J := I UNTIL OBJECTS DO 
31 END 
15 STRING (27) ALPHA; .67 
16 BEGIN READON (ORDERS (1.J)); .oo 
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for all skill levels (E-I = .72, E-B = .47, I-B = .57, allp < .Ol); but in 
the normal version, correlations were large only between the adjacent 
skill groups, and not between Experts and Beginners (E-I = .57, I-B = 
.69,p < .Ol, and E-B = .23,p < .lO). 
We have replicated the correlation between expertise and recall that 
has been found in similar studies of expert-novice differences, both in 
computer programming (Love, 1977) and in other domains. The next step 
in understanding the basis for this superior recall is to examine the differ- 
ences in the way subjects organize their recall. 
EXPERIMENT II 
A rich source of low-level concepts that are useful in understanding the 
structure of a program is found in the language’s reserved words. Re- 
served words specify particular, important functions in the language and 
thus cannot be used for other purposes by the programmer. Con- 
sequently, ALGOL W reserved words were selected for use in the second 
experiment. Using the Reitman and Rueter technique, we inferred indi- 
vidual subjects’ organizations of the reserved words, expecting to find 
differences that are related to skill level. 
Method 
Subjects of the same three skill levels as in Experiment I were run individually in a 
free-learning, free-recall task. They were each given a shuftled deck of twenty-one 3 x 5 in. 
cards on which were written the ALGOL W reserved words selected for this experiment, 
one word per card. Subjects were asked to learn the words so that they could recall them 
aloud without the aid of the cards. It was suggested that sorting the cards might help them 
learn the words more easily, and all subjects did so while learning. After the subjects went 
through their own self-paced, self-directed study-test procedures, they were given some 
practice trials. On most of these trials, subjects recalled as they wished (“noncued” trials); 
on a few others (“cued” trials), they were asked to start with a given word, continue with 
those “that go with it,” and recall the remainder. The data collection phase began after the 
subjects had correctly recalled all 21 words on two consecutive practice trials. 
In this phase, the subjects were tape-recorded as they recalled all 21 words 25 times. On 21 
trials they were “cued” with one of the ALGOL W words, each word serving as a cue on 
one trial; on the rest of the trials, they were not cued. If recall on a particular trial was in 
error, that trial was repeated at the end of the scheduled 25 trials. Because recall times were 
being collected to validate the Reitman and Rueter technique, only those ALGOL W re- 
served words with one syllable were used. (See McKeithen (1979) for a discussion.) Addi- 
tionally, four abbreviations of polysyllabic words, such as ABS and DIV, were excluded 
because of the pronunciation difficulties that they might have caused. The final set of words is 
listed at the “leaves” of the trees in Figs. 3-8. 
Twenty-two subjects served in this experiment: eight Experts, six Intermediates, and 
eight Beginners. The Experts and three of the Beginners had participated in Experiment I. 
The new Beginners and Intermediates tit the skill levels as described in Experiment 1. Four 
of the six new Intermediates had previous experience with either BASIC or FORTRAN. 
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Resulis 
The recall orders from each subject were analyzed using the Reitman 
and Rueter algorithm (1980). This algorithm searches all of a subject’s 
recall strings for all groups of items that always appeared contiguously, 
regardless of order. For example, in the four strings at the top of Fig. 2, 
the nontrivial groups of contiguously recalled items are ABC, BC, DEFG, 
DEF, EFG, DE, EF, and FG. These groups form a lattice under set 
inclusion (Fig. 2b); the lattice can be represented either as an ordered tree 
(Fig. 2c) or as a parenthesized expression (Fig. 2d). Consistency in the 
order of recall of groups (such as a list or an ordered set of chunks) 
appears in the lattice as overlapping groups; e.g., DEFG, DEF, EFG, DE, 
EF, and FG indicate that DEFG was always ordered. Determination of 
whether the order was always the same (a “unidirectional chunk”) or one 
order and its reverse (a “bidirectional chunk”) requires inspection of the 
original recall strings. In our example above, DEFG is a unidirectional 
chunk. Unidirectional chunks are indicated on the trees by single-headed 
arrows over the constituent branches and in the parenthetic expression by 
square brackets. Bidirectional chunks are indicated by double-headed 
arrows in the trees and angle brackets in the parenthetic representation. 
“Nondirectional chunks,” those whose constituents appear in any order, 





b. Lattice of Chunks 
ABCDEFG 
c. Ordered tree 
d. Expression 
((A(Bc))CD E F Gl 1 
FIG. 2. Example analysis of recall strings by the Reitman-Rueter technique. 
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FIG. 3. A Beginner’s organization of 21 ALGOL W reserve 

















:d words, apparently based on 
are indicated by the absence of an arrow in the tree and by curved paren- 
theses in the parenthetic expression. 
In the following, the organizations obtained for the 22 subjects are 























FIG. 4. Another Beginner’s organization of 21 ALGOL W words, apparently based on a 
story mnemonic (Subject 13). 






















FIG. 5. An Intermediate’s organization of the ALGOL W words, showing a mixture of 
ALGOL and common-language chunks (Subject 2). 
Figures 3-8 show six trees typical’ of the kinds of structures obtained 
for subjects at each skill level, two for Beginners (Figs. 3 and 4), two for 
Intermediates (Figs. 5 and 6), and two for Experts (Figs. 7 and 8). The 
Beginners appear to have used a variety of general mnemonic techniques. 
In Fig. 3, the chunks in which the words begin with the same first letter or 
have the same length indicate that this Beginner was using a mnemonic 
technique based on orthography. In the large unidirectional tree in Fig. 4, 
that of another Beginner, the common language sequences such as 
DO-FOR-WHILE, TRUE-IS-REAL-THEN-FALSE, and BITS-OF- 
(LONG-AND-SHORT)-STRING indicate story construction, another 
frequent mnemonic technique for Beginners. 
The Intermediates, having seen these words in the context of the 
ALGOL W course they just completed, showed more clustering specific 
to meaning in ALGOL W. In Fig. 5, the IF-THEN-ELSE and FOR- 
STEP-WHILE-DO chunks are evidence for programming knowledge, 
whereas the STRING-IS-NULL-BITS and END-OF-REAL-CASE ap- 
pear to be natural language sequences. In Fig. 6, another Intermediate, 
IF-THEN-ELSE and AND-OR-TRUE-FALSE-BITS are ALGOL W 
r Subjects selected as examples were those whose organizations were easy to characterize 
and appeared to be representative of their skill group. Afterward, we noticed that they are 
prototypical in another sense: They all felI in the middle of their skill-level cluster on the 
vertical “Expert” dimension in Fig. 9 (described later in the paper). These six subjects are 
marked in this figure with “feet,” ovals drawn where their stems hit the reference grid. 






















FIG. 6. Another Intermediate’s organization, again showing a mixture of ALGOL and 
common-language chunks (Subject 21). 
chunks, but the others are less clear. It appears as if the Intermediates’ 
organizations show amixture of ALGOL W and natural-language chunks. 
The Experts’ structures show a great deal of clustering according to 
meaning in ALGOL W. In Figs. 7 and 8, WHILE-DO and FOR-STEP 















FIG. 7. An Experts’ organization, showing chunking based on ALGOL meaning 
(Subject I). 





















FIG. 8. Another Experts’ organization, again showing ALGOL-based chunking 
(Subject 4). 
SHORT-REAL cluster for their descriptive function of data types. And, 
in Fig. 8, the four chunks, CASE-OF, FOR-STEP, WHILE-DO, and 
IF-THEN-ELSE, all cluster because they are the words that control the 
flow of the program, the others being more static or descriptive in nature. 
Only END is unchunked in these trees; its logical mate, BEGIN, was 
eliminated from the recall set because it has more than one syllable. 
The six trees just discussed in detail were picked to be representative of 
their skill-level groups. All subjects figure in the analyses that follow. We 
examine three questions: Are Experts more organized than Beginners? 
Do the depths of the organizations differ across the skill groups? Do 
organizations within a skill group look alike? 
Are Experts more organized? Bushke (1976) and others have shown 
that the more chunking one does, the better the recall. It may be, then, 
that our Experts in Experiment I recall better because they have more 
organization, more chunks, or more ordering between items or chunks. 
To answer this, we need to attach to each subject’s ordered tree a number 
reflecting the amounr of organization. Though the literature offers several 
measures of organization based on the number of items appearing con- 
tiguously on successive trials (e.g., Tulving, 1962; Pellegrino, 1971), we 
adopted one that is also sensitive to the multilevel and order information 
in these ordered trees. 
The measure is called PRO for “possible recall orders.” It is a function 
of the number of different recall orders that could be generated from the 
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inferred tree. In general, the smaller the PRO, the more organization in 
the structure. (See Reitman & Rueter (1980) for a discussion.) 
The Experts had a mean PRO of 6.8, Intermediates 14.6, and Beginners 
7.8. None of the differences was significant, primarily because of the high 
variability among subjects (i.e., the range of PROS was 45). At least for 
this simple measure of the amount of organization, there was no differ- 
ence among skill levels. 
Do the depths of the organizations increase with skill level? If a subject 
normally organizes information in chunks of chunks, he is likely to be able 
to recall better in a short-term recall task because the code held in STM, a 
higher-level node, refers to more information, that from several chunks. 
Chase and Simon, finding that their Experts revealed more chunks than 
beginners though they showed no larger a STM capacity, argued similarly 
that Experts’ chunks might be hierarchically organized. It may be that our 
Experts’ organizations are deeper, more nested, than Beginners’. The 
Expert in Fig. 8, for example, has a deeper organization than does the 
Beginner in Fig. 4. If we examine all 22 subjects, however, we find that 
the average number of nodes between root and terminal items for Experts 
is 2.26, for Intermediates it is 1.79, and for Beginners it is 1.88. None of 
these differences is significant. Depth of organization does not seem to 
increase with skill level. 
Do subjects within a skill group organize the particular words in similar 
ways? The above results suggest that it is unlikely that the overall pattern 
of organization provides the advantage in recall performance. More 
likely, it is the content of these organizations, the match between the way 
these concepts are stored and the way they appear in the program to be 
recalled. We would expect Experts’ organizations to be similar, based on 
useful programming relationships. And, we might expect Intermediates’ 
and Beginners’ organizations to be similarly clustered within their skill 
group but based on relationships less useful in recalling a program. 
What did our subjects’ organizations have in common? Table 3 lists all 
of the chunks common to four or more subjects of any skill level. In the 
listing, the chunks have been grouped according to the distribution of 
occurrences in the skill levels. LONG-SHORT, TRUE-FALSE, and 
the other chunks listed at the top of the table are nearly equally repre- 
sented in all skill levels, presumably because of their common associa- 
tions in ordinary discourse and ALGOL W. IF-THEN-ELSE, CASE-OF, 
FOR-STEP, WHILE-DO, and those listed in the middle are chunks com- 
mon only to Experts and some of the Intermediates, presumably because 
they are ALGOL W-based chunks. The chunk listed at the bottom of the 
table was the only chunk common to Beginners but not Intermediates or 
Experts. This list indicates that Experts and some Intermediates shared 
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TABLE 3 
Proportion of Experts (E), Intermediates (I), and Beginners (B) 
Whose Trees Include These Chunks 
E I B 




TRUE FALSE AND OR 
DO FOR STEP 
WHILE DO FOR STEP 
DO STEP 
Chunks more common for Experts 










LONG SHORT REAL STRING BITS 
LONG SHORT REAL 
Chunk more common for Beginners 
All but END” 
” END was recalled either first or last. 
1.00 .50 .62 
75 .67 .62 
.62 .17 .38 
.25 .33 .12 
.25 .50 .12 
.25 .50 .12 
.12 .17 .25 
.88 .50 .12 
.88 .50 .38 
1.00 .50 .12 
.88 .83 .25 
1.00 .50 .oo 
.88 .67 .oo 
.75 .17 .oo 
.62 .33 .12 
.50 .17 .oo 
.38 .ll .12 
.50 .oo .oo 
.50 .oo .oo 
.oo .oo .50 
some aspects of their organizations, presumably ALGOL associations, 
and that Beginners shared very few aspects, presumably choosing differ- 
ent common-language associations from the many available. 
The homogeneity of organizations within skill levels can be assessed 
formally. What is necessary is a measure of the similarity of each pair of 
trees, and a more global analysis of all these pairwise similarities that 
reveals clusters of similar organizations. These clusters would then be 
examined for their correspondence to subjects’ known skill levels. 
The required global analysis of similarities is readily available from 
multidimensional scaling (Shepard, 1962a, 1962b). Measures of the simi- 
larity between two ordered trees, however, were not so readily available. 
The “cophenetic correlation” between pairs of trees’ item-distance ma- 
trices (Sneath & Sokal, 1973) appeared, but it was dismissed because it 
failed to capture the order information in our trees (a fully nondirectional 
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bush and a fully ordered list would be identified as maximally similar). 
Consequently, we devised our own measure, one that is appropriate to 
Reitman-Rueter-ordered trees as well as ordinary hierarchies (such as 
those produced by Johnson’s (1967) hierarchical clustering scheme). 
Our measure of the similarity of two trees is based on the number of 
nontrivial chunks the two trees have in common-chunks at all levels in 
the tree, excluding single items and the group of all items. Thus, the tree 
(((AB)(CD))EFG) shares one chunk with ((ABCD)(EFG)), i.e., ABCD, 
and three with (((AB)(CD))(E(FG))), i.e., AB, CD, and ABCD.* 
More precisely, we define the similarity between two trees as: 
In (the number of chunks the two trees have in common + 1) 
In (the total number of chunks contained in both trees -I- 1) 
By dividing the number of common chunks by the total, we construct a 
proportion in common. The greater the similarity, the greater the propor- 
tion of chunks two trees share. The logarithmic transformation eliminates 
the significant correlation found between the total number of chunks and 
the ratio. Distance is then given by 1 - similarity. 
To compare the Experts’, Intermediates’, and Beginners’ organiza- 
tions, we first filled a distance matrix with the distances between each pair 
of trees as described above, then applied multidimensional scaling. The 
best solution (stress = .093) was the three-dimensional configuration 
shown in Fig. 9, where the trees of the individual subjects are labeled by 
their skill level: Experts as circles, Intermediates as squares, and Begin- 
ners as triangles. In this picture, subjects who shared many chunks (and 
thus organized the words similarly) appear close together. Pairs of sub- 
jects who had dissimilar organizations, e.g., an alphabetizer and a story- 
teller, appear far apart. If Experts had organized in ways similar to each 
other, and Beginners and Intermediates in ways like their cohorts but 
unlike Experts, this figure would have shown three separate clusters. 
The actual configuration does not have three separate clusters ordered 
on an “Expert” dimension; it is conical, with the Experts close to each 
other at the apex, and most of the less skilled subjects placed lower on the 
* In counting the number of chunks in common when a directional chunk is involved, all 
overlapping subchunks implicit in the directional chunk (and elements of the lattice of all 
chunks) are included. Thus, [ABCD] has two of its five nontrivial chunks in common with 
((AB)(CD)), i.e., AB and CD, but not BC, ABC, or BCD. and one chunk in common with 
((ABC)D), i.e., ABC, but not BCD, AB, BC, or CD. There is no distinction in this measure 
between uni- and bidirectional chunks. 
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FIG. 9. The 
organizations. 
multidimensional scaling configuration of the distances between subjects’ 
vertical “Expert” dimension and spread further apart.3 It seems mean- 
ingful to label the vertical dimension but not the other two. They were 
simply necessary to adequately separate the disparate Beginners and In- 
termediates. 
Table 4 shows the average distances within and across skill-level 
groups. Experts are more cohesive as a group than either of the other two 
groups. Furthermore, the Intermediates and Beginners are on average 
slightly closer to the Experts than they are to each other. 
DISCUSSION 
The classic expert-novice difference in short-term recall of meaningful 
material was replicated in the domain of computer programming. Unlike 
the similar studies in other domains, our Experts’ superiority was not 
restricted to the first trial; they continued to recognize familiar segments 
of code after the first trial, so their performance diverges from that of the 
lesser skilled subjects. This difference may arise from the fact that the 
pictorial representations in chess, Go, bridge, and electronics diagrams 
allow Experts to recognize familiar chunks at a glance, whereas the com- 
puter experts required several trials to understand the program’s various 
functions, recognize its overall structure, and then recall more 
chunks-on each successive trial. 
Having demonstrated this recall difference, we went on to delineate the 
3 The two striking outliers in this configuration are Intermediate subjects, one in the upper 
left and one at the lower right. The upper subject has very little organization; only three pairs 
of items were chunked. The subject at the lower right was the only subject to have com- 
pletely alphabetized the set of words. 
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TABLE 4 
Average Distance between Subjects within and across Skill Groups 
Experts Intermediates Beginners 
Experts .52 .61 .79 
Intermediates .73 .80 
Beginners .81 
particulars of the organizations of computer concepts that likely contrib- 
ute to this task. All subjects memorized the computer language keywords, 
but the strategies they brought to bear on the memorization task differed. 
Finally-and most important-these different strategies were related to 
skill level. 
Beginners, ignorant of the functional significance of these words, ap- 
peared to adopt very general mnemonic techniques for memorizing and 
recalling the words. Typical were chunks of words with common first 
letters and lengths, words alphabetized by first letters, and small 
common-language sequences that are probably parts of stories. The 
number of possible organizations of these words based on common as- 
sociations is large; each word by itself has a variety of associations, and 
different ones are selected depending on contexts provided by the sub- 
ject’s current thoughts or by the words next to it in that trial’s presenta- 
tion. Beginners shared at most only a few chunks with each other, result- 
ing in large distances between them in the multidimensional scaling con- 
figuration. 
The Intermediates were more similar to each other in their organiza- 
tions, presumably because they all had recent common experience with 
the ALGOL W meaning of these words. They probably used these associ- 
ations during the experiment and thus shared more chunks, both with 
each other and with the Experts. In many ofthese subjects’ organizations, 
however, we see some common-language sequences, indicating that not 
all the recently learned computer associations were as strong as prior 
ones. Thus, REAL-CASE occasionally loomed stronger than CASE-OF, 
and BITS-OF-STRING stronger than nonnumeric data types STRING 
and BITS. 
The Experts’ associations from long-term experience with these words 
in programming predominated over common-language associations. Their 
organizations contained words grouped according to their function in 
ALGOL W, and resulted in a set of remarkably similar organizations that 
were clustered tightly in the multidimensional scaling configuration. That 
Intermediates were more similar to the Experts than to each other attests 
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to the convergence of their associations to those capturing the functional 
meaning in ALGOL W. 
It is easy to see how this functional organization helps the Experts 
recall the computer program in the short-term recall task of Experiment I. 
If the subject knows that BEGIN goes with END, that WHILE(FOR- 
STEP)DO initiates loops, etc., then whenever he encounters one con- 
stituent of a chunk he expects the other. Subjects then either look for 
these in the program, or assume they are there and guess them in recall. 
These associations are the pegs on which the details of the program hang, 
like the classic mnemonic pegs of the Method of Loci and the Pegword 
System (Bower, 1970). 
What we have shown here, despite complicated preliminaries, is simply 
a correlation between expertise and particular mental organizations of 
concepts in the field of expertise. It is tempting to conclude that this 
organization produces expertise. Though this may be true, these data do 
not prove it; they merely exhibit that subjects with an existing skill level 
have a particular common organization. To conclude that learning this 
organization would increase skill requires a demonstration of within- 
subject skill changes. However, our intuitions that acquisition of well- 
ordered knowledge produces greater skill, reflected in our educational 
principles, would make such a demonstration unsurprising. 
The work here does suggest that the application of the Reitman-Rueter 
technique to Experts’ recall of large programs might be useful to the study 
of “structured programming.” A structured program is a hierarchy of 
independent possibly ordered chunks. If Experts’ mental organizations 
match that hierarchy, arguments about cognitive advantages of that style 
of programming would be empirically rather than intuitively based. 
Finally, the procedure introduced here for measuring the similarity of 
two tree structures based on the proportion of chunks they have in com- 
mon generated results that were meaningful and interesting. There were 
clear, easily interpreted patterns of skill difference in our multi- 
dimensional scaling configuration. Though the specific limits of the mea- 
sure have not yet been fully explored, it has face validity and is applicable 
to both Reitman-Rueter and other hierarchical representations. 
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